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EcoPeace Middle East Pre-Feasibility Study: The Humanitarian and Trade Corridor Jordan – West Bank – Israel – Gaza

ECO PEACE MIDDLE EAST

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THE PROJECT

This project was carried out by **EcoPeace Middle East.**

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Finally, the content of this report and opinions expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the European Union or the funders of EcoPeace Middle East.

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Executive Summary

In light of the unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe resulting from the ongoing war on Gaza, there is an urgent need to establish a robust and scalable logistical mechanism to ensure the sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance and commercial goods to the 2.3 million residents of the Gaza Strip. The Humanitarian and Trade Corridor (the "Corridor") is conceived as a strategic initiative to meet this critical need by facilitating the flow of aid and trade into Gaza, while laying the foundations for its long-term recovery and reconstruction.

This initiative is not only a humanitarian necessity but also a framework for revitalizing Gaza's economy and fostering regional integration and cooperation. Once hostilities cease and a stable political arrangement is achieved, the volume of required aid and trade flows will surge to levels far beyond pre-war norms. As projected in this study, Gaza will require over 5,500 truckloads per day, which is more than ten times the daily average in 2023 and the immediate post-ceasefire figures from January 2025.

Ensuring an orderly, uninterrupted, and large-scale flow of aid and commercial cargo is essential for any viable rebuilding and stabilization process—not only for Gaza but for the Palestinian Territories as a whole. The scale of this logistical challenge necessitates a paradigm shift. A new, purpose-built logistics system must be established to support continuous and reliable access at this volume.

The study outlines the streams of aid and trade that the Corridor needs to facilitate, and the components of the Corridor - logistical hubs and crossing points. It provides estimates for the required capacities of these components, analyzes bottlenecks across these logistical chains (infrastructures, constraints, procedures and other factors), and suggests logistically, economically and politically feasible solutions.

This study presents a comprehensive framework for the Corridor's development, outlining:

- ✔ **Key aid and trade streams** to be immediately facilitated;
- ✔ The **core infrastructure components** (including logistics hubs and crossing points);
- ✔ **Capacity estimates** for each component;
- ✔ A detailed **analysis of current bottlenecks**, including infrastructure limitations, regulatory hurdles, and operational constraints;
- ✔ And **feasible solutions**—logistical, economic, and political—to overcome these challenges.

Based on this analysis, the study proposes the development of a **master plan**, to be built in phase II of this project on the following strategic pillars**:**

- **Humanitarian Aid Delivery:** Ensure timely, efficient, and equitable distribution of aid to address the immediate and ongoing needs of Gaza's population;
- **Build and operate the Corridor** as a strong enabler of **sustainable re-building** of Gaza Strip, and re-vitalization of the Palestinian economy;
- **Deep involvement of regional players,** connectivity and integration into the regional economic system;
- **Public-Private Partnership (PPP) approach** – Leverage the capabilities and resources of the private sector in the Corridor's planning, implementation and operations**.**

While the study does not delve into political arrangements, it clearly acknowledges that **implementation of the Corridor will require a stable political environment**, underpinned by durable governance, security, and international coordination. A comprehensive and integrated approach is essential, recognizing the interdependence of humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and political stabilization. **Nevertheless, urgent action is required.** The study recommends proceeding on two parallel tracks:

1. **Immediate development of a detailed master plan**, including the design and planning of all critical infrastructure and logistical components;
2. **Simultaneous initiation of practical, on-the-ground steps**, implementable under current conditions, as outlined in the final section of this report.

Moreover, the potential establishment of a rapid-response humanitarian mechanism would further underscore the necessity and urgency of operationalizing the Corridor. As clearly demonstrated in this study, a **functioning Aid and Trade Corridor is indispensable** to any effective and sustained humanitarian operation in Gaza.

Introduction

The **Humanitarian and Trade Corridor** (hereafter, *the Corridor*) is proposed as a **strategic multi-functional infrastructure and governance mechanism** to facilitate the **efficient, continuous, and secure flow of humanitarian aid and commercial cargo into the Gaza Strip**. Born out of the devastating impacts of the ongoing war on Gaza, the Corridor is envisioned as a **cornerstone of post-conflict recovery**, enabling immediate relief efforts and supporting the **long-term economic and social reconstruction of Gaza Strip**.

The urgency of this initiative cannot be overstated. As outlined in numerous global assessments—including by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), ESCWA, World Bank, Egypt's plan for the reconstruction of Gaza —**Gaza's humanitarian and infrastructure collapse** demands a new, scalable logistics model that is both **technically robust and politically viable**. In this context, the Corridor serves as a critical enabler of not only **humanitarian assistance**, but also a **policy instrument for regional cooperation**, stability, and peace-building.

Corridor Structure and Policy Dimensions

The Corridor will interlink Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza Strip through Israel, consisting of several essential components. It will provide integrated physical and institutional connectivity and is designed around five core components:

1. **Physical Infrastructure:**
   Development of **logistics hubs, border crossings, inspection systems (scanners), and multimodal facilities** necessary for the seamless flow of aid and trade into Gaza. These components are aligned with international standards and draw from best practices in crisis-response logistics.
2. **Operational Framework:**
   A coherent set of **protocols, regulatory simplifications, and institutional arrangements**, agreed upon by key stakeholders, to facilitate expedited and accountable movement of humanitarian and commercial cargo.
3. **Distribution Interfaces within Gaza Strip:**
   Establishment of **secure and coordinated interfaces with local Palestinian Private Sector led distribution systems**, including warehousing, processing, last-mile delivery mechanisms, and monitoring tools to ensure equitable access for all population groups.
4. **Transport Connectivity:**
   The Corridor is envisioned to **interlink with regional transport initiatives**, such as the **ESCWA Trans-Arab Transport Corridors**, **Arab League's Integrated Road & Rail Plan and Strategy**, Arab Maritime Bridge Initiative, **EUROMED Transport Network**, and the **India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC)**. It may also serve as an anchor for future **cross-border peace-building infrastructure**, such as the "Peace Triangle" concept between Israel, Jordan, and Palestine.

5. **Regional Cooperation:**
   The initiative is structured to encourage **multi-lateral partnerships**, including **public-private partnerships (PPP)** and international donor involvement, fostering economic resilience and advancing **the regional integration of the Palestinian economy**.

Focus of this Pre-Feasibility Study

Given current **financial constraints and political uncertainty**, this **Pre-Feasibility Study** focuses on researching the first three foundational pillars on the announced **EcoPeace Middle East** ToR: **physical infrastructure**, **operational procedures**, and **distribution logistics within Gaza**. This focused scope is designed to offer **a practical roadmap toward immediate implementation of phase II of this project**, while building institutional and financial momentum for future phases.
The study provides detailed **technical, economic, and policy analysis**, identifying key bottlenecks—including infrastructure deficits, regulatory challenges, and coordination gaps—and proposes **feasible solutions**. It also sets out guidelines for a future **Master Plan**, organized around the following strategic pillars:

- **Humanitarian Aid Delivery: Ensuring timely, efficient, and equitable distribution of humanitarian aid to meet the immediate needs of the population across the Gaza Strip.**
- **Build and operate the Corridor: As a strong enabler of sustainable re-building of Gaza, and re-vitalization of the Palestinian economy**
- **Deep involvement of regional players: Strengthening cooperation with regional actors and integrating Gaza Strip into wider economic and trade networks**
- **Public-Private Partnerships (PPP): Mobilizing private sector expertise and investment to enhance capacity and innovation.**

Policy Preconditions and Strategic Orientation

The successful realization of the Corridor depends on **baseline conditions of security, stability, and governance**. Although the current study does not elaborate on political arrangements—deemed beyond its scope—it recognizes that any implementation of the Corridor will **inevitably require a political framework** that ensures durable stability and international oversight.
A comprehensive approach is therefore essential, recognizing the interdependence between humanitarian response, infrastructure development, political stabilization, and institutional governance.

Call for Immediate Action

Despite political uncertainties, the study strongly recommends proceeding on two parallel tracks:

1. **Technical Design Track**: Finalize the **master planning and design** of each infrastructure and operational component outlined in this study.
2. **Implementation Track**: Begin **immediate, phased implementation of activities** that can be initiated under current conditions—such as preparatory works, land acquisition, and initial logistics coordination.

The **accelerated roll-out of the Corridor** will be particularly critical if emerging emergency coordination mechanisms are launched, on the basis of Palestinian Private Sector and local communities. In such a scenario, the Corridor would serve as the **backbone for sustaining an effective humanitarian operation**, capable of scaling rapidly and with accountability.

A comprehensive approach is therefore needed, as rebuilding, political stabilization and sustainable governance are inter-connected. The study relates to the flow of aid and trade. Elaboration on political arrangements is out of scope. Nevertheless, implementation of the proposed Corridor requires political arrangements that would achieve stability, security, and governance.

This study was commissioned by **EcoPeace Middle East**, whose invaluable input and guidance throughout the process shaped the scope, direction, and practical recommendations of the work. The consultancy team extends its gratitude to the many **national, regional, and international stakeholders**—including government, regional and UN officials, logistics experts, and private sector actors—whose insights were instrumental.

Through a combination of in-depth consultations, technical workshops (including in **Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Amman**), and field analysis, this study presents a robust foundation for moving from **concept to implementation**. The next phase will involve:

- Translating the framework into detailed **engineering, operational, and financial designs (comprehensive master-planning)**; and
- Launching immediate steps to establish **critical components on the ground** to support relief, recovery, and ultimately, resilience.

Understanding the Challenge: A Paradigm Shift is Imperative

The humanitarian and logistical challenge that awaits in the **post-war Gaza Strip** is set to be **unprecedented in both scale and complexity**. Decades of infrastructure degradation, chronic blockade, and now widespread destruction due to war have left Gaza with **minimal capacity** to absorb the **volumes of humanitarian aid and commercial goods** that will be required once hostilities cease. As this study illustrates, **Gaza's recovery cannot succeed without a radical transformation in the existing aid and trade logistics model**.

Beyond Emergency Relief: A Logistics Surge for Recovery and Economic Re-entry

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, large-scale humanitarian operations will be needed to address the basic survival needs of a population already suffering from mass displacement, malnutrition, widespread trauma, and critical shortages in water, food, fuel, healthcare, and shelter. However, this immediate response phase is only the beginning.

The launch of reconstruction efforts—spanning housing, schools, hospitals, utilities, and public infrastructure—will require the import of massive volumes of construction materials and equipment, well beyond what Gaza's border facilities and internal systems can currently process. In parallel, the resumption of economic life—reviving Gaza's agriculture, light industry, retail, services, and informal sectors—will depend on the steady flow of commercial imports, including inputs, tools, and technology.

Without a **dedicated logistical system**, these multiple demands will quickly overwhelm existing mechanisms, leading to delays, misallocations, and heightened humanitarian risks.

Quantifying the Need: A Tenfold Increase in Supply Chain Capacity

As detailed in this study, post-conflict Gaza will require an estimated 5,500 truckloads per day to meet combined humanitarian and commercial needs. This represents a tenfold increase compared to the pre-war daily average in 2023 and the January 2025 daily average immediately following the ceasefire.

To contextualize this magnitude:

Pre-war Gaza managed an average of approximately 500 truckloads per day under controlled entry.

During most of 2024, due to active conflict and access constraints, the number fell to less than 100 trucks per day—a figure that is negligible compared to the anticipated post-war needs.

This gap reveals a dramatic shortfall that cannot be bridged through incremental adjustments. It requires a systemic overhaul of the existing logistics model—encompassing infrastructure, governance, inspection processes, and coordination mechanisms.

Implications: Existing Systems Are Functionally Obsolete

The current border infrastructure and supply chain arrangements, shaped by years of restrictions and emergency management frameworks, are inherently unfit for post-war recovery operations. Key limitations include:

- Physical bottlenecks at crossings and terminals;
- Lack of central warehousing and cold chain capacity;
- Fragmented distribution channels and secured centers inside Gaza; and
- Cumbersome regulatory procedures governing cargo movement and inspection.

As demonstrated in 2024 and early 2025, even small surges in demand led to severe delays, duplication of efforts, and losses in critical supplies. These patterns cannot be repeated during the recovery and reconstruction phase, where delays translate directly into prolonged suffering and instability.

A Paradigm Shift Is No Longer Optional

Meeting the scale of Gaza's humanitarian and economic recovery will require more than increased throughput—it will demand a complete rethinking of how aid and trade flow into and within Gaza.

A dedicated Humanitarian and Trade Corridor, with integrated logistics hubs, secure and efficient crossing points, transparent operational frameworks, and regional partnerships, must be developed as a central pillar of the post-war recovery and reconstruction strategy.

This is not merely a matter of logistics—it is a matter of policy, peace, and dignity. Without this paradigm shift, the international community will face repeated cycles of humanitarian breakdown. With it, Gaza has a genuine opportunity to recover, rebuild, and reconnect with the region and the world.

Chart 1: Overall number of truckloads entering Gaza: 1997 – January 2025, in comparison to the required quantity once stability is achieved

(Number of trucks per day, daily average)



Notes:

(1) Daily figures: until end 2023 - indicative averages computed from monthly data, assuming 20 work-days per month as a long-term average.

(2) Entry from Israel to Gaza in 2001 – 2004 relates to the Karni Crossing only

(3) Data for 2005 - 2023 exclude fuels and cooking gas

(4) COGAT Data from January 2024: (a) includes fuels and cooking gas, (b) commercial shipments were documented only by COGAT as well as maritime and aerial (aerial dropped aid reported in pallets, 22 pallets = truck), (c) data on fuels and cooking gas as reported by COGAT (reported in litters and tons, converted to truckloads 15 ton = 15,000 litter = 1 truckload

(5) Daily average from Oct 2023 computed per 30 workdays of crossing per month

(6) OCHA data for Oct 2023 and 2024 - not including fuel and cooking gas, aerial route.

Sources:

1997 – 2004 data – collected and computed from IMF Staff Report, April 2011, p. 5; UNSCO, April 2011, p. 7-8, 16. Israel, Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 13 April 2011, p. 35; UNESCO Reports 1999 – 2000

2005 - 2023 data is from UN OCHA reports:
https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/movement-and-out-gaza-update-covering-august-2023
For Oct 2023 and 2024 https://www.ochaopt.org/data/crossings accessed on Jan 25, 2025. COGAT data is used as well. See note (4): https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/main/

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For Oct 2023 and 2024 https://www.ochaopt.org/data/crossings accessed on Jan 25, 2025. COGAT data is used as well. See note (4): https://gaza-aid-data.gov.il/main/

Orderly and continuous flow of aid and commercial cargo into Gaza, at the required quantities, is a pre-condition for successful re-building and stabilization of Gaza, and the Palestinian arena in general.

In view of the magnitude and complexity of this challenge, a paradigm change is a must for structuring and operating a system that would allow continuous flow of such quantities into Gaza Strip.

The full Pre-Feasibility Study will present a comprehensive plan: the required transportation – logistics system, operational framework, and distribution Interfaces - based on detailed needs-analysis and discussions with stakeholders.

The paradigm that guides the proposed system is that long-term sustainable solutions must be built on the following two elements: (1) **Comprehensive solutions**; whereas economic and infrastructure aspects (transportation – logistics in the case of the Corridor) are intertwined with political and security solutions; and (2) **Strong third-party leadership**. The current Government of Israel is not cooperating with the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and therefore no sustainable solutions are proposed. A strong coalition of internationals is needed to support the PA to take lead.

Methodology and Structure of the Study

This study employs a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary, and data-driven approach, combining quantitative modeling, policy analysis, infrastructure assessment, and stakeholder consultation. The objective is to define the scale of the challenge facing post-war Gaza, design a robust humanitarian and trade logistics system, and propose feasible policy and operational responses for immediate and future implementation. The report is structured into three principal parts, each corresponding to a critical layer of analysis and system design.

The first part of the study presents a quantitative analysis and estimates of required imports into the Gaza Strip (in terms of truckloads per day). These estimates are presented in comparison to the number of truckloads entering the Gaza Strip before and after October 2023.

The second part outlines the main streams of aid and trade that the Corridor needs to facilitate, as well as the **components of the Corridor:** logistical chains, infrastructure issues, procedures, security, etc. The study elaborates on the considerations relating to the key components.

The third part is an analysis of present and expected bottlenecks and constraints across these logistical chains, and what is needed for the relaxation of these bottlenecks.

Based on the above analyses and in consultation with concerned parties and experts, it's suggested to develop:

- **Guidelines for economically, logistically and politically feasible solutions and a coherent master plan for the Corridor.**
- **Immediate practical steps for implementation**

The analysis and recommendations presented in this report have been discussed with the teams of EcoPeace Ramallah, Tel Aviv and Amman, as well as Palestinian, Israeli, Jordanian and international stakeholders and experts (**Annex A**). Their most helpful thoughts and comments have been integrated into this study.

Part 1

Quantifying the Challenge: Understanding the Scale of Required Imports

The unprecedented magnitude of the present crisis requires unprecedented efforts

- This section presents a rigorous quantitative analysis of the **expected daily import volumes** into Gaza following the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a stable political and governance framework. These estimates, measured in **truckloads per day**, are grounded in needs-based modeling of humanitarian aid, reconstruction materials, and commercial inputs. In view of the enormous magnitude of destruction in Gaza Strip and the extreme extent of destitution of its population, the scale of required funding for rebuilding and immediate aid is unprecedentedly high.[1]
- We estimate the price tag of a comprehensive Gaza Strip rebuilding plan - including wider aspects relating to Palestine as a whole, as well as shorter-term emergency support at the magnitude of USD 100 billion.[2]
- This extraordinary funding effort must be accompanied by an equally extraordinary level of effort in tailoring and implementing political, security, administrative and governance solutions.

The Corridor is the most urgent precondition for starting Gaza rebuilding and enabling a sustainable long-term stabilization process. Without a well-functioning aid and trade corridor, aid delivery will continue to be insufficient, and rebuilding will not be able to start.

Import need analysis

Given the destruction of almost all production capabilities of the Gaza Strip, literally everything required for consumption, rebuilding and reactivating the economy must be imported into Gaza. Hence, once stability is achieved, rebuilding starts and economic life resumes, the volume of required imports will be unprecedentedly large. In addition to large quantities of aid and consumption products, the start of rebuilding would require huge volumes of building

[1] See a snapshot as of end-January 2025, in Annex B

[2] An early 2025 Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (IRDNA) which was conducted jointly by the World Bank, UN and EU put an estimate of US$53.2 billion for Recovery and reconstruction needs - see Gaza-RDNA-final-med.pdf page 5. The latest IRDNA report covers damages and losses for only 12 months (i.e., 8th Oct 2023 to 8th Oct 2024), which should be linearly interpolated to 19 months as of the date of this final report, as the war on Gaza is still going on. Therefore, the study team has arrived at an estimate of US$100 billion for Recovery and reconstruction needs by considering exponential interpolation for socioeconomic losses and lost opportunities during 19 months war duration rather than 12 months. In addition, these estimates tend to grow considerably as planning and execution advance. We expect short-term emergency requirements (for the first 3 years) to grow much higher than the US$20 billion estimated in the IRDNA; while longer term re-building costs are expected to be way higher than the estimated figures in the IRDNA.

materials, while resumption of economic life will generate similarly huge demand for commercial imports (inputs for Industry and agriculture, machines and equipment, etc.).

The following is a summary table of our detailed analysis of required imports, **presented in Annex C.**
It shows a total required volume of circa 5,500 truckloads per day.

Table 1: Required quantities of imports
(Once stability is achieved, full-scale aid delivery enabled, re-starts and economic life resumes, estimates for first 2 years, assumed to start on H2 2025)

Categories of goods	Number of trucks per day (360 workdays of crossings per year)
Food products	150
Bottled water and beverages	50
Baby products	3
Non-food household consumption products	95
Residential units	1,825
Non-residential public buildings	174
Business-sector buildings	348
Infrastructures facilities, excluding roads	104
Roads	1,167
Open paved public areas, sidewalks, etc.	58
Temporary prefabricated houses and sheltering items	431
Equipment and machines for industry, agriculture, building, infrastructure facilities, etc.	100
Industrial, agricultural and other inputs	400
Medical supplies, etc.	30
Cars, trucks, spare parts, etc.	50
Fuels, oils, etc.	400
Other, not included elsewhere	200
Grand total	5,584

Source: Annex C

The required volume is ten times the pre-war average per working day in 2023, or that of January 2025, after the ceasefire (Chart 1 above).

Key Insights:

- The projected **daily import volume is approximately 5,500 truckloads per day**.
- This volume is **ten times the pre-war average per working day in 2023**, and also exceeds the volumes recorded in **January 2025 after the ceasefire** (as illustrated in Chart 1 and Table 1).
- For reference, during 2024, amid active conflict, Gaza was receiving on average **100 trucks per day**, which is negligible compared to the scale required for recovery and economic reactivation.

This unprecedented demand cannot be met by existing logistics frameworks, underscoring the need for **a paradigm shift in the infrastructure, governance, and policy architecture** governing aid and trade into Gaza.

Part 2

Components of the Corridor

Key Streams of aid and trade the Corridor needs to facilitate

This part of the study outlines the **streams of aid and trade** that the Corridor must facilitate, alongside the **logistical infrastructure and crossings** required to support such volumes. The corridor should support eleven streams of aid and trade, which are expected to flow into Gaza, once ceasefire is achieved and re-building efforts are initiated:

From Jordan and the West Bank

1. Aid via and from Jordan – JHCO (Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization)
2. Commercial cargo via and from Jordan
3. West Bank commercial cargo via Shaar Ephraim
4. West Bank commercial cargo via Tarqumiyah
5. Humanitarian Aid from the West Bank

From and via Israel

6. Shipments from Ashdod / Haifa ports and Ben Gurion Airport
7. Cargo from/via Israel
8. Shipments from/via Eilat port

From Egypt, Sea and Air

9. Overland shipments via **Rafah Crossing and Karm Abu Salem**
10. Direct maritime aid deliveries to **a Gaza seashore dock**
    Directly by air to Gaza
11. Emergency air shipments to **temporary Gaza landing sites**

Required Physical Facilities

These streams of aid and trade require smooth and effective functioning of a set of logistical hubs, international and internal crossings, and landing points – as outlined below and illustrated in the maps.

Logistical hubs

- A central Logistical Hub in North-Gaza
- South-Gaza Logistical Hub
- West Bank logistical Hub (in Jericho)
- Amman Logistical Hub

International crossing points

- King Hussein Crossing
- Prince Mohammad ("Damyia) Crossing
- Rabin crossing (Arava near Eilat)
- Rafah Crossing

- Nitzana (Al-Auja) Crossing
- An emergency dock on the Gaza seashore
- A temporary air landing points in Gaza

Internal crossing points

- Erez Crossing (Beit Hanoun)
- Erez West (Zikim) Crossing (Beit Lahiah)
- Karni Crossing (Al-Mintar)
- Kerem Shalom Crossing (Karm Abo Salem)
- Shaar Ephraim Crossing (TulKarm)
- Tarqumiyah Crossing

This structure of (1) logistical hubs in focal points of the logistical system, and (2) multiple crossings with increased capacity and landing points, is needed for sustaining effective flow of aid and trade at the required quantities.

Maps showing the elements of the Corridor

Southern route from Jordan and West Bank logistical Hub in Jericho to Gaza – avoiding congested roads in the center of Israel





The required capacity of key facilities

(see detailed analysis below)

	Required capacity (trucks per day)
Logistical hubs	
North Gaza Central Logistical Hub (the main Gaza hub)	**4,000**
South Gaza (secondary) Logistical Hub	**3,000**
Jericho National Logistical Hub	**5,000**
Key crossing points	
King Hussein Bridge Crossing (KHB)	**4,000**
Erez East, Erez West, and Karni	**4,000**
Kerem Shalom	**2,000**
Rafah	**2,000**

Considerations relating to the logistical hubs

The proposed logistical hubs are the cornerstones of the Corridor. Hence their location, functions and related arrangements are of primary importance.

The following are the main considerations relating to the logistical hubs. These considerations focus on the specific needs of the Gaza-directed humanitarian and trade corridor. Nevertheless, the proposed plan is fully aligned with the Palestinian government Road and Transport Master Plan of 2018, where logistics is strictly intertwined with Border Crossing Points (BCP). [3]

The proposed system includes two main hubs, one in the North of Gaza Strip (**the North Gaza Central Logistical Hub)**, and the second in Jericho (**the Jericho National Logistical Hub).** A third, secondary hub, is proposed to be in the South of Gaza Strip (**South Gaza Secondary Logistical Hub)**.[4]

- **The North Gaza Central Logistical Hub** will function as: (1) the hub for storage and handling of aid and trade shipments that enter Gaza from the north and the east, as well as sea and air shipments, (2) the center of the distribution network of aid across the Gaza Strip.
  - As shown in the analysis below, the North Gaza Central Logistical Hub is **expected to serve up to 4,000 incoming truckloads per day**. Additionally, it needs to serve a large number of smaller trucks that will take goods from the logistical hub for distribution within the Gaza Strip.
  - **We propose to locate the North Gaza Central Logistical Hub** in the place of the now-destroyed Gaza Industrial Estate (GIE), adjacent to Karni border crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip. This location seems optimal from logistical, transportation, and security aspects, as elaborated below.
  - These advantages would enable the **North Gaza Central Logistical Hub to become a focal point for the re-vitalization of the Gazan economy**, around which large-scale processing industries and other economic activities will develop (see below).
- **A secondary Logistical Hub may be required in Gaza** to support aid and trade shipments coming from the south and the south-west, via the Kerem Shalom, Rafah and Nitzana Border Crossing Points (BCPs). Considering the number of truckloads expected to enter via these crossings, this logistical hub should be designed to support up to 3,000 truckloads per day

[3] Road and Transportation Master Plan - PALESTINE EMERGING

[4] In addition to the key logistical hubs presented in this study, additional local logistical facilities may develop beside some of the internal crossings between the West Bank and Israel.

- **The Jericho National Logistical Hub** will be developed as phase 3 of the Jericho Agro-Industrial Park (JAIP), adjacent to the Karama / King Hussein Bridge - BCP.
  - According to our analysis, significant part of aid and trade shipments to Gaza will come from the east via the King Hussein BCP (from Jordan and the Gulf countries, as well as south and east Asia countries via the Port of Aqaba and the land route from Abu Dhabi / Dubai and other UAE and Saudi ports). These shipments need storage, sorting, handling and partially re-packing or processing for shipment into Gaza. That will be done in the Jericho National Logistical Hub.
  - As the King Hussein BCP is the only entry point of Palestine from the east, the Jericho National Logistical Hub would serve West-Bank-destined shipments originating in the east, as well as shipments destined to Gaza.
- Since Amman serves as a hub where aid shipments coming from the Arabian Gulf countries and from the east in general, **another logistical hub is required in Amman.**

The central Logistical Hub in North-Gaza (CLH-NG)

- We propose to locate the CLH-NG north-east of Gaza City adjacent to Al-Mintar/Karni border crossing with Israel. In cooperation with the UN and support of donors, CLH-NG will be built and developed as a central facility, operated by Palestinian Private Sector to deliver aid to the various UN and other approved aid centers across the Gaza Strip. The facility will be built in stages starting with storage and processing, expanding to packaging and manufacturing of essentials such as large-scale kitchens, bakeries, children food factories and ready-to-eat meals. It will also expand to include key components such as specialized storage for dry and liquid bulk cargo, cement, sand and aggregates, refrigeration and freezing facilities, water desalination units, solar panels, etc.
- **The CLH-NG will be part of a larger secure zone that will include the crossings with Israel on the north and north- east Gaza Strip (Erez East and West, Karni and maybe also a few other smaller crossings on the north-east. This secured zone will go south down along the eastern border of Gaza with Israel, until the** eastern end of the **east-west** Netzarim Corridor. The secure zone will **also include the Netzarim Corridor itself and a sea-landing facility on the western end of the Netzarim Corridor. The suggested helipad too will be located inside the security zone.**
- **The CLH-NG will become a focal point to the development of a large logistical – transportation – industrial complex, which would serve as a strong engine for the economic revival of the Gaza Strip.**

- Given security considerations relating to the logistical hub, as well as the delivery of humanitarian aid, its location close to the borderline between Israel and Gaza could be optimal to receive and manage humanitarian aid and trade shipments for the upcoming 3 to 5 years.

This integrated infrastructure—featuring **routes, logistical hubs at key geographic nodes**, **multiple crossing points with enhanced capacity**, and **multimodal landing interfaces**—is essential for sustaining an **efficient, high-volume flow of humanitarian and commercial goods**.

Part 3

Bottlenecks in Crossings and Required Interventions

This section analyzes the **existing and projected constraints** across the logistics chain, including:

- Limited border capacity and inspection throughput
- Inadequate storage, cold chain, and distribution systems
- Fragmented coordination across jurisdictions
- Regulatory and security-related delays

The report then identifies **policy, technical, and operational reforms** necessary to eliminate these bottlenecks, including:

- Expansion of crossing capacities
- Harmonization of inspection and customs processes
- Digital tracking and transparency mechanisms
- Establishment of coordinated, multilateral governance structures

Even though regulations relating to flow of shipments to Gaza change often, this section starts with a summary of the present (December 2024) procedures, as a reference. Then, bottlenecks are analyzed and proposed solutions presented for the different crossings.

Present shipment flow procedures to Gaza (as of early December 2024):

I- **Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO)**

- All donated items are stored at JHCO warehouses in Amman from different donors
- JHCO obtain the COGAT approval
- Pallets loaded on Jordanian Military trucks
- Military Jordanian trucks cross Allenby bridge
- After security and customs inspections at Allenby Bridge, pallets re-loaded on the same Jordanian trucks
- Jordanian trucks escorted by IDF move to either Erez East or Erez West (Zikeem) crossings based on the instructions of COGAT
- The pallets are offloaded in Erez or Zikeem.
- Pallets are loaded on Gazan trucks and move to northern Gaza
- Frozen cargo is not allowed

II- **Humanitarian aid from the West Bank by International organizations**:

- COGAT allows donation shipments purchased either from Israel or West Bank markets
- Cargo loaded on Palestinian trucks from the West Bank and move to either Sha'ar Ephraim or Tarqumia border crossing
- After security inspection, pallets are loaded on Israeli trucks and moved to Kerem Shaloom.
- After security inspection at Kerem Shalom, trucks move to either Erez East or Erez West (Zikeem) crossings.
- Pallets are loaded on Gazan trucks and move to north Gaza

III- **Commercial shipments**:

- Gazan merchants submit application to COGAT with copies of their ID and certificate of registration with the PA
- COGAT responds of the date of entry to Gaza
- Cargo is loaded on Palestinian trucks and moved to either Tarqoumia or Shaa'r Ephraim border crossing.
- After security inspection, cargo is loaded on Israeli trucks and moved to the Kerem Shalom border crossing.
- At Kerem Shalom, the cargo is security checked and offloaded at a special storage area.
- Gazan trucks take the cargo and move to southern Gaza.

The King Hussein Bridge Crossing (KHB)

Bottlenecks

In the first half of 2024 this crossing served close to 200 import trucks per day (on average) carrying cargo that requires screening, and roughly a similar number of trucks that do not require screening (mainly cement and aggregates).[5]

According to our estimates the pre-war demand for import-entry to Palestine from the east was at least triple these figures. However, the capacity of the **KHB** was confined to the figures indicated above, due to the following set of constraints:

- A primary constraint to the movement of goods across the KHB is the **limitations on the direct movement of cargo in containers**, through KHB.
- **Working hours of the one scanner** that operates in KHB is another primary constraint.
- **Manual inspections**. Manual inspections are taking place for certain of the shipments even though the shipment is scanned. That is creating delays in the movement of goods due to duplication of procedures.
- **Working hours of the crossing at large** are a limiting factor as well.
- A fundamental, most impactful set of challenges relate to the current **"Back-to-Back" process**, which has profound consequences on trade across the KHB with and via Jordan.
- Another most severe set of constraints that limit Palestinian trade through KHB relates to the **absence of adequate supporting systems outside the KHB**. That includes lacking logistical infrastructures such as a lack of cooled areas for handling sensitive fresh agricultural products, and other detrimental mechanisms and limitations.
- Finally, the **inadequate infrastructure on the Jordanian side of the KHB.** Although it has been operating commercially for about twenty-five years, the current infrastructure and existing equipment is far from being adequate to support large-scale activity. The security offices, customs and clearance companies are still operating in caravans scattered around without a link between them and there are no suitable buildings to carry out work comfortably and efficiently.

[5] Later on, the crossing was working at a much lower capacity due to newly imposed security procedures by Israel.

Proposed guidelines for solutions

- Once the humanitarian and trade corridor to Gaza starts working as per the estimates presented above (and considering also the expected growth in imports from the east into the West Bank), **the required capacity of the KHB would grow tenfold, to 2,500-plus truckloads of "regular" truckloads (that can be scanned), and 1000-plus truckloads of aggregates and cement.**
- For KHB to serve these quantities of shipment, all the above constraints need to be answered, as follows:
  - **The crossing should shift to 24/7 mode of work,** while expanding the KHB staff accordingly. For capacity to grow above 300 trucks per day, the crossing should work in full two-shift mode,; **and to serve a demand of 1000 incoming truck loads per day it should shift to 24/7 work.**
  - **Expanding scanning capacity** by adding 2-3 more scanners:
    - The capacity of the present one scanner is 16 import trucks per hour.
    - So, for shipments of 200 trucks per day, the working hours of this scanner need to be extended to two shifts; and then to three shifts, to ser00 trucks per day.
    - **To serve the pre-war demand of around 1000 incoming truckloads per day, KHB needs 3 scanners working 24/7, under the present back-to-back procedures.**
  - **More efficient use of scanners, while applying security check methods that minimize manual inspection.**
  - **Direct movement of cargo in containers will be allowed**
  - **The "Back-to-Back" process should gradually shift to 'door-to-door',** using advanced security arrangements, as has been partly introduced in Israeli – Palestinian crossings.
  - **The infrastructure and equipment on the Jordanian side of the KHB need to be upgraded.**
  - **Adequate supporting logistical infrastructures, etc**. can be provided by the new Jericho National Logistical Hub.

Prince Muhammad – Damya Bridge

The closure of Prince Muhammad Bridge in the early 2000s is another main impediment to Palestinian trade. In the past, this Bridge was designated for Palestinian export only. Since its closure, all Palestinian export cargo has been diverted to KHB.

It is recommended to re-open Dayma Bridge to supplement KHB and/or will be designated for certain specific activities.

Gaza-entry crossings

- The larger part of Gaza-destined cargo (aid and trade shipments) will come from the north and the east (Jordan, West Bank and Israel) - entering Gaza via **Erez East and West, Karni** and maybe also a few other smaller crossings on the north-eastern border with Israel (**see map below**).
    - **These crossings will be required to handle cargo of up to 5,000 truckloads per day,** heading to the North-Gaza Central Logistical Hub (CLH-NG) (suggested to be in the now-destroyed GIE near the Karni Border Crossing).
    - **As mentioned above, the CLH-NG and these crossings will be part of a secure zone that will go down along the eastern border of Gaza with Israel, to the** eastern end of the **east-west** Netzarim Corridor, and **across the Netzarim Corridor itself, to include a sea-landing facility on the western end of the Netzarim Corridor.**
    - For these crossings to serve that magnitude of shipments, their capacity needs to be expanded as per the guidelines suggested above for the King Hussein Bridge Crossing.
- Another, smaller part of shipment coming via Israel, will enter Gaza through the Kerem Shalom Crossing. Kerem Shalom would also be required to handle part of the shipments coming from Egypt, via the Egyptian – Israeli border crossing in Nitzana. This crossing seems to have the required capacity for the expected magnitude, around 1,000 truckloads per day.
- Most of the aid and trade shipments entering Gaza from Egypt, are expected to enter via the Rafah Crossing. That will include cargo coming from/via Egypt proper, as well as cargo coming through Al-arish seaport and airport.
    - Considering the comparative advantage of Egypt in categories such as building materials and petroleum products, the magnitude of cargo entering via this crossing is expected to increase manyfold – to a level of more than 2,000 truckloads per day.
    - So, as in the case of the northern and north-eastern crossings, the Rafah crossing needs to expand its capacity ten times, as per the guidelines suggested above.

A Map of the present crossings (as of December 2024)

West Bank – Israel crossings

- Large part of the Gaza-destined cargo from and via Jordan, as well as cargo from the West Bank, is expected to flow through the Tarqumiyah Crossing (near Hebron), while smaller part would flow through the Shaar Ephraim Crossing (near Tul Karm). These are the largest crossings between the West Bank and Israel, with a capacity to handle around 1,000 trucks per day, each.
- However, according to our analysis, the additional Gaza-destined traffic would more than triple the number of truckloads passing through Tarqumiyah. That requires significant expansion of this crossing – to a capacity of above 3,000 truckloads per day.

Sea and helipad facilities in Gaza

- **Maritime Facilities**
  The idea of establishing a maritime corridor from Cyprus to Gaza, supported by a temporary sea dock, is a strategic approach to ensure the rapid delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza.
  - In the immediate term, as an alternative route for aid delivery, bypassing damaged infrastructure and land-transport constraints.
  - Moving forward, the temporary sea dock will gradually develop to become a large-scale international seaport. The Gaza Port would provide a resilient and independent mechanism for aid delivery, as well as serving as an anchor of trade and economic development for Gaza and for the Palestinian economy at large.

- **Helicopter airdrops in Gaza**
  - Given the challenges of land-based aid delivery, helicopters are essential for getting immediate aid into hard-to-reach areas. That includes food, water, water purification equipment, medical supplies and other essential and/or urgently needed items.

- Our recommendation is to locate the central base of the helicopter airdrop operation beside CLH-NG (North Gaza Central Logistical Hub) in the secure zone of north-east Gaza Strip.
- From this base, the helicopter airdrop operation will use a fleet of 10-15 helicopters to meet the urgent needs for food, water, medical supplies, and shelter, with each helicopter making multiple daily flights. Key landing zones (helipads) should be located in secure and high-need areas across the Gaza Strip, with careful attention to security and de-confliction efforts to ensure the safety of both humanitarian personnel and those in need of assistance.

Road transportation challenges and procedures

The large number of Gaza-destined trucks expected to move over the already congested roads of the West Bank and Israel, pose significant safety and security challenges.

To cope with this challenge, we propose the following guidelines:

- Move most of the trucks to Gaza at night, when roads are free, in guarded convoys
- Split the flow of trucks that come from the KHB Crossing and the Jericho Logistical Hub between two routes: (1) via the Tarqumiyah Crossing to the Erez Crossings on the north of the Gaza Strip, and (2) via the "southern route" - south on road n°90, and then westwards along roads n°31 and n°25 along, to the Karni Crossing and maybe also other crossings on the north-eastern border of the Gaza Strip (optionally also to Kerem Shalom)
- For shipments coming from the northern and central parts of the West Bank, use also the Shaar Ephraim Crossing

Challenges relating to distribution of aid inside the Gaza Strip

Distribution of aid in Gaza is done by multiple organizations and NGOs. The following is a list of them (as of end-2024):

- **United Nations aid agencies**:
  - WFP (World Food Program)
  - UNICEF (United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund)
  - UNDSS (United Nations Department of Safety and Security)
  - OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
  - WHO (World Health Organization)
  - UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund)
  - UNDP (United Nations Development Program)
  - FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization)
  - UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services)
  - UNRWA (UN Relief and Works Agency)
- **Other organizations and International NGOs:**
  - IRC (International Rescue Committee)
  - GEM (Global Empowerment mission)
  - NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council)
  - Save The Children
  - Project Hope
  - Anera (American Near East Refugee Aid)
  - IMC (International Medical Corps)
  - UK-MED (UK Emergency Medical Team)
  - MSF (Médecins Sans Frontières / Doctors Without Borders)
  - WCK (World Central Kitchen)
  - Water Mission
  - RAHMA (Relief and Humanitarian Aid Mission for All)
  - MedGlobal
  - CRS (Catholic Relief Services)
  - ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)
  - Mercy Corps
  - The Samaritan's Purse
  - The Red Crescent

However, the challenges associated with aid corridors and the broader political context continued to complicate aid delivery efforts. According to several UN Reports published over the October 2023 – December 2024 period, only 30% - 40% of planned aid deliveries and needed humanitarian assistance could reach its intended recipients due to ongoing conflict and logistical barriers.

The main challenges faced by aid organizations include:[6]

- Security Risks: hostilities have made it dangerous for aid workers to operate effectively, resulting in incidents of violence against humanitarian convoys.
- Logistical Barriers: Blocked access points and damaged infrastructure

The UN and INGOs have been increasingly deterred by lawlessness and active combat along the delivery routes (Financial Times, 2024). Private traders have pushed into the security void in Gaza, providing more food and basic goods than the UN but leaving Palestinians exposed to profiteering and spiraling prices. As of end-2024 a network of traders between Cairo, the West Bank, Israel and Gaza co-ordinates the entry of trucks. Israel has given more traders access to permits since April 2024, but these remained concentrated in the hands of a few traders. It was unclear on what basis the permits were granted. According to insiders, to bring one truck shipment from the West Bank to Gaza, the trader pays between $5,000 and $35,000 for a permit on the secondary market, depending on the value of the goods; $3,000 to guard the truck inside Gaza; and a minimum of $4,000 in transport fees. Two-thirds of the commercial deliveries originate from Israel and the remainder from the West Bank, according to chamber of commerce data from July 2024 (Financial Times, 2024).

Cross-Cutting Recommendations

Based on the above analysis and in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders—including **EcoPeace Middle East**, the study proposes two immediate priorities:

1. **Development of a coherent master plan**, with:
    - Technically detailed design of corridor components
    - Economically viable and regionally coordinated infrastructure planning
    - Politically realistic implementation pathways
2. **Implementation of early-phase actions**, including:
    - Launching construction and upgrade works on selected crossings
    - Establishing interim logistics platforms
    - Aligning stakeholders on operational protocols

[6] The analysis of challenges of Distribution of aid in Gaza relates to the situation in 2024. As of now (nearly the middle of 2025) the situation as it may develop after a new ceasefire is achieved, is unclear. However, the key challenges will remain the same – security risks and logistical barriers.

The Corridor as the Foundation for Recovery

The magnitude of the Gaza crisis, both in humanitarian and reconstruction terms, requires a **logistics solution of exceptional scale and sophistication**. The **Humanitarian and Trade Corridor** is the proposed system through which such a solution can be operationalized—providing the foundation for **stabilization, recovery, and regional integration**.

Therefore, it's utterly important to establish a governance structure that will be responsible for facilitating, coordinating, monitoring and verifying the distribution of humanitarian assistance inside Gaza, in line with the United Nations Security Council resolution 2720 (2023), and in coordination with the Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator for Gaza (SHRC).

Guidelines for a detailed master plan and immediate steps for implementation

This pre-feasibility study focused on:

- **Assessing the needs**: **what is required to flow into Gaza** in terms of humanitarian aid and trade, once the Gaza war ends and a stable political arrangement for the government of Gaza is achieved; **and analyzing how orderly and continuous flow of the required quantities of aid and trade can be facilitated**, in a way that would enhance longer-term re-building of Gaza
- **Charting the physical components, operational framework and distribution interfaces of the Aid and Trade corridor,** in line with the need assessment and analysis

Based on the above, **we suggest a set of guidelines, as presented below, upon which a detailed master plan for the Aid and Trade corridor can be prepared.**

From our discussions, we trust these guidelines are generally accepted by the relevant stakeholders. **The work on the detailed master plan will be done together with these stakeholders.**

We also present below a set of immediate steps, suggested for implementation while working on the master plan

Guidelines for a detailed master plan

The first part of the detailed master plan should be detailed analysis of each category and sub-category of the required quantities of imports as presented in Table 1 and Annex C of the pre-feasibility study, namely:

- Detailed analyses and estimates regarding sources of import, considering aspects such as (a) the comparative advantages of key suppliers (West Bank, Egypt, Israel, other sources) in relation to different goods; (b) enhancing fast and cost-effective handling of specific goods (such as cement, sand, aggregates and other building materials, other products shipped in bulk, products that need cooling, etc.)
- Per each category and sub-category - looking into the best and fastest ways of encouraging local production, and gradually lessening the dependency on imports
- Drill-down into certain sub-categories that require special attention and analysis, such as: WASH infrastructure related issues – fuel, pipes, pumps, etc.; specific energy-related issues (solar panels, etc.); inputs for agriculture and Industry

Based on the above, preparing a plan for each of the logistical hubs and crossing points suggested in the pre-feasibility study. These plans will show how the guidelines suggested for solving the bottlenecks across the Corridor are implemented, including:

- **Detailed procedures for the smooth operation of the Corridor**, considering all the streams of aid and trade that flow to Gaza, as well as secured and effective connections with the internal distribution systems for aid and trade within the Gaza Strip
- **Detailed estimates of the required investment** for building new facilities**,** expansion and improvement of existing facilities as per the detailed plans mentioned above; and
- **The timeline and priorities** for building and operation of the different facilities of the Corridor, probably starting with provisional facilities where required
- Expanding on aspects of land transportation and traffic management – how to minimize the impact on main roads in Israel and the West Bank, as well as issues relating to main and secondary roads inside the Gaza Strip.

The master plan should also include in-depth analysis of inter-connections between the Aid and Trade Corridor to wider aspects of Gaza's re-building plans, transport connectivity and regional cooperation aspects, including:

- Links to key transportation projects, which are envisioned to be part of Gaza re-building plans: the new Port of Gaza, railway connections with Israel and Egypt, newly built main and secondary roads inside Gaza, and more. The master plan of the Aid and Trade Corridor will relate to these planned projects: how the different physical and other components of the Corridor (crossings, logistical hubs, etc.) intertwine with these planned facilities.

- Integration with Regional Cooperation initiatives:
  - Being a very small territory and economy, the economic revival of Gaza requires intensive trade and other economic relations with the West Bank, Israel, Egypt and the region at large.
  - Given Gaza's location and other advantages, re-vitalization of the Gazan economy is expected to become a primary growth engine for the Palestinian economy. The Port of Gaza and its connection to Egypt are of special importance once integrated into wider regional cooperation initiatives, such as IMEC, etc.

The following are other important guidelines that have been emphasized in the discussions held with stakeholders and experts and in their comments:

- **Involvement of the Palestinian business sector.** The Corridor should be designed and operated in ways that will maximize the involvement of the Palestinian private sector, leveraging the flow of aid and trade into Gaza as a growth engine - especially the Gaza, but also for the West Bank.
- **Involvement of Jordanian private-sector parties**
- **Involvement of strong regional business-sector parties**. Encourage Joint Ventures of Palestinian business-sector players with strong regional parties (e.g., Egyptian companies) for the development, financing and operation of the logistical hubs, and in other related economic activities. ant anchors to ensure the Such strong regional player will bring into Gaza and the Palestinian economy World Class execution and financing capacities. Their involvement will become an anchor of economic and political stability.
- **Financing**:
  - **Considering the guidelines suggested above, the construction and operation of the logistical hubs and other key elements of the Corridor will be financed by business-sector parties.** Given the large volume of humanitarian aid and trade that will pass through these facilities, that would be an attractive investment for the strongest regional players in the field of logistics and related fields (some of them government-owned companies and others private sector companies), as well as regional and international banks.
  - The relevant governments and the international community should provide the required guarantees and the political envelope for stable and safe operation of the Corridor.
  - The international community, as well as regional governments, will be required to finance initial costs - planning, infrastructure, as well as security and other costs related to the governance envelope of the Corridor.

The detailed master plan should also analyze the economic impact on the West Bank and explore ways to maximize the benefits for the Palestinian economy in general. A similar analysis should be conducted for maximizing the economic benefits to Jordan and Egypt.

Immediate steps

The following steps are proposed for immediate implementation, on a provisional basis. These steps are derived from the guidelines, and will be later integrated into the orderly implementation of the full-scale master plan:

- **Immediate operation of provisional facilities in the northern part of the Gaza Strip:**
  - **A "Provisional Main Gaza Logistical Hub", which will be located near the Karni border crossing with Israel, in a secure zone to be agreed upon with the international community in north and east-north areas of the Gaza Strip.**
    - This Provisional Main Gaza Logistical Hub will serve as a hub where aid will be stored and handled, for distribution to the northern and central parts of the Gaza Strip.
    - The proximity to the crossing points on the one hand, and access to Gaza's main roads and the Netzarim Corridor on the other hand, makes this place a natural focal point for a central logistical hub.
  - **As suggested in the study, the agreed secure zone will also include the crossings with Israel on the north and north- east Gaza Strip (Erez East and West, Karni** and maybe also a few other smaller crossings on the north-east)**. This secured zone will go south down along the eastern border of Gaza with Israel, until the eastern end of the east-west Netzarim Corridor. The secure zone will also include the Netzarim Corridor itself and a sea-landing facility on the western end of the Netzarim Corridor. The suggested helipad too will be located inside the security zone.**
  - **The presently operating crossings on the north and north-east of the Gaza Strip will shift to 24/7 operation mode. This too will be done under provisional arrangements between the IDF, the international community (with US leadership) and the aid organizations working in Gaza.**
  - These provisional arrangements will be extended to include also an upgraded mechanism for distribution of aid from the Provisional Main Gaza Logistical Hub, through the secured Netzarim Corridor (for distribution in central parts of the Gaza Strip) and through main roads in the northern parts (also included in the secure zone).

- **Similar immediate provisional arrangements for the Rafah Crossing and significantly increasing the number of trucks entering Gaza through Kerem Shalom.** These provisional arrangements will include, inter alia: agreement between the IDF and the international community on operation of secure zones in the south (the Philadelphi Corridor, areas around the Kerem Shalom Crossing and main roads near the borders with Israel), 24/7 operation of the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings, and distribution of aid to the southern parts of the Gaza Strip using secure roads.

- **These provisional arrangements, combined, can increase the total number of trucks entering Gaza, to well above 1,000 per day.** That will dramatically improve the humanitarian situation and create a much more conducive atmosphere for advancement towards stable long-term solutions.

- **In parallel, we propose a few immediate measures on the King Hussein Bridge Crossing (KHB), which would enable entry of hundreds of aid truckloads per day, directly to the provisional main hub in North Gaza:**
  - **The KHB will shift to 24/7 mode of work**
  - **Allowing entry of aid in containers under a special arrangement, as follows:**
    - Aid shipments will be containerized and sealed at JHCO warehouses in Amman, as per agreed and supervised security procedures (like the "door to door" procedures already working in West Bank – Israel crossings).
    - Sealed aid containers will pass the KHB, scanned, and then move in secured caravans, at night, directly to the provisional main hub in North Gaza.
    - There, the sealed containers will be opened, and the cargo prepared for distribution.

Summary

This pre-feasibility study lays the foundation for a detailed master plan centered on:

- **Assessing import requirements for aid, rebuilding, and trade**
- **Mapping corridor infrastructure and operational protocols**
- **Detailing hub locations, facilities and capacities**
- **Identifying and solving bottlenecks**

The following next steps are proposed for immediate action as phase II of this study:

1. **Master Plan Development in collaboration with key stakeholders and implementing agencies.**
2. **Immediate Actions:**
    - **Upgrade crossings infrastructure and facilities**
    - **Mobilize donor support for Logistics Hubs**
    - **Pilot “door-to-door” transport clearance systems**
    - **Activate maritime and air support nodes**

Conclusions

Implementation Roadmap:

1. Abstract Conclusion

The Corridor is an urgent, strategic initiative to address the severe humanitarian needs in the Gaza Strip stemming from the ongoing war. It aims to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid and commercial goods, ensuring efficient distribution and enabling sustainable reconstruction and economic revival. Its main objectives are to:

I. Deliver humanitarian aid at scale and speed
II. Support the rebuilding of Gaza's destroyed infrastructure
III. Stimulate economic reactivation and regional trade
IV. Integrate Gaza into wider regional cooperation frameworks
V. Accommodate a core capacity need of 5,500 truckloads/day (10x pre-war average)

2. A Paradigm Shift is Required

Post-war Gaza will face an unprecedented crisis:

- Total collapse of domestic production and public infrastructure
- Full import dependency for basic needs, construction materials, and economic inputs
- Aid flows during 2024 -2025 averaged only 100 trucks/day—grossly inadequate (no aid flows are allowed since early March 2025 until today)
- Humanitarian assistance alone cannot sustain the lives of 2.3 million people and therefore, commercial goods must be permitted to smoothly enter Gaza to complement the aid and support livelihood creation.

Forecasted Need:

- 5,500 trucks/day = 10x pre-war volume
- Requires new logistics systems, governance, and financing models

This is not just a logistics upgrade—it is a strategic imperative for stabilization and recovery.

3. Corridor Architecture: Streams and Components

11 Streams of Aid and Trade:

Jordan, West Bank, Israel, Egypt, and maritime/airborne sources

Key Infrastructure Components:

- Central Hubs: North Gaza, South Gaza, Jericho, and Amman
- Crossings: KHB, Rafah, Kerem Shalom, Karni, Erez East/West, Shaar Ephraim, Tarqumiyah
- Sea and air support nodes (temporary dock, helipads)

Design Principles:

- Scalable, secure, and flexible infrastructure
- Interoperability with regional systems (e.g., IMEC, ESCWA, EUROMED)

4. Logistical Hubs – Strategic Role and Design

North Gaza Central Logistical Hub (CLH-NG):

- Location: In Gaza Industrial Estate at Karni crossing
- Daily Capacity: 4,000 truckloads and last-mile dispatch to distribution centers
- Facilities: Modular storage, cold chains, meal prep, bulk storage, water/energy
- Role: Anchor for Gaza's aid operations and economic recovery

Jericho National Logistical Hub (JNLH):

- Phase 3 of Jericho Agro-Industrial Park
- Gateway for aid/trade from Jordan, Gulf, and Asia
- Serves West Bank and Gaza flows

South Gaza Hub:

- Entry from Rafah, Kerem Shalom, and Nitzana
- Capacity: 3,000 truckloads/day
- Compliment JNLH

5. Bottlenecks and Border Crossing Constraints

King Hussein Bridge (KHB):

- Current: ~200 trucks/day
- Required: 3,500/day
- Constraints: Limited scanning, manual checks, "back-to-back" system
- Solutions: Shift to 24/7, containerized secure corridors, add scanners

Gaza Entry Points:

- Northern crossings to be upgraded to support 5,000 trucks/day
- Rafah and Kerem Shalom to increase throughput to 3,000/day
- Secure humanitarian zone across Netzarim and eastern corridor to be activated

Road Transport Challenges:

- Proposed solutions: night convoys, alternate routes, traffic management protocols

6. Governance and Distribution Coordination

Current Distribution Landscape:

- UN Agencies, 20+ INGOs, private traders (often informal, high-cost)
- As of end-2024, only 30–40% of planned aid reaches recipients

Proposed Governance Framework:

- Unified coordination under UNSC Resolution 2720 (2023)
- Lead: Senior Humanitarian and Reconstruction Coordinator (SHRC)
- Tasks: Access management, transparency, aid verification, conflict deconfliction

7. Master Plan Guidelines – Strategic Blueprint

Components:

1. Import analysis by product and origin (Annex C)
2. Detailed plans for hubs, crossings and routes
3. Operational procedures and infrastructure costing
4. Investment phasing and traffic solutions

Integration:

- Align with Gaza Port, proposed rail links, regional trade corridors
- Position Gaza as a trade and logistics hub within broader regional architecture

Private Sector Involvement:

- Palestinian, Jordanian and Egyptian firms
- Strategic regional logistics investors
- PPP models for financing and operations

Financing and Guarantees:

- Capital from logistics firms, banks, sovereign funds
- Donor funding for start-up, infrastructure, and governance envelope

8. Immediate Action Plan – Early Implementation Track

Provisional Infrastructure:

- Launch of Provisional Gaza Hub at Karni area
- Secure corridor to include: Karni, Erez East/West, Netzarim, maritime helipad

Expanded Crossing Access:

- Shift crossings to 24/7 operations
- Increase Rafah and Kerem Shalom throughput
- Activate secure southern routes to convey aid to Gaza Central Hub at Karni

Jordan-Gaza Corridor Activation:

- KHB: 24/7, sealed containers, Amman–Gaza night convoys
- Target: 500–1,000 trucks/day in weeks

9. Economic and Political Impact

For Gaza:

- Mass humanitarian relief
- Infrastructure reconstruction engine
- Employment and SME growth

For the West Bank, Jordan, and Egypt:

- Trade expansion, logistics services, customs modernization
- Deeper regional economic integration

For Donors and International Community:

- Stabilization of a protracted humanitarian crisis
- Peace dividends via regional economic cooperation

10. Call to Action

The Humanitarian and Trade Corridor for Gaza is not a proposal—it is a necessity.

We invite donors and partners to:

- Co-develop the Master Plan
- Fund the startup infrastructure and security envelope
- Support PPP models and governance structures
- The corridor defeats the hidden purpose of population transfer

Lead now—Gaza cannot wait.

Annex A: Consultations with Stakeholders and Experts

As part of the preparation of this Pre-Feasibility Study for the Humanitarian and Trade Corridor into Gaza, the study team undertook extensive consultations with a wide range of stakeholders, government institutions, aid organizations, and private-sector experts across the region. These consultations—both formal and informal—played a critical role in shaping the guidelines, recommendations, and policy proposals set forth in the study.
The engagements were designed to ensure alignment with national policies, incorporate regional perspectives, and reflect operational realities. These consultations occurred between January August 2024 and May 2025, during field visits, stakeholder roundtables, technical workshops, and bilateral meetings in **Ramallah, Jericho, Jerusalem, and Amman**.

1- Palestinian Stakeholders

2- **Ministry of Transportation**: Provided insights on existing transport infrastructure and reconstruction priorities.
3- **Ministry of National Economy**: Discussed trade dependency, local market dynamics, and private-sector reactivation.
4- **Ministry of Public Works and Housing**: Provided insights on existing road networks and reconstruction priorities.
5- **Palestinian Authority Administration for Borders and Crossings (ABC)**: Offered key data on existing crossing operations, capacity limitations, and coordination challenges.
6- **PLO – Negotiations Support Unit (NSU)**: Provided strategic framing of the Corridor within the post-conflict governance and recovery vision.
7- **UN and Humanitarian Agencies in Gaza and Ramallah**: Shared operational data, needs assessments, and distribution constraints.
8- **Palestinian Private Sector Leaders**: Representatives from logistics, construction, food processing, and wholesale trade sectors discussed investment readiness and PPP participation.

9- Israeli Stakeholders

10- **COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories)**: Provided access procedures, regulatory considerations, and security coordination frameworks.
11- **Former COGAT Officials**: Contributed lessons learned from previous large-scale entry programs (e.g., post-2014 reconstruction).
12- **Israel Crossings Authority**: Shared technical insights on border infrastructure, throughput capacity, and inspection processes.
13- **Former Officials from Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Transportation**: Offers perspective on long-term planning for dual-use goods, risk mitigation, and civil-military coordination.
14- **Israeli Business Community**: Engagements with exporters and logistics operators familiar with Gaza and West Bank markets.

Jordanian Side, Egypt and international Partners

15- **Jordan Hashemite Charity Organization (JHCO)**: As the lead humanitarian entity in Jordan, JHCO shared operational procedures and discussed expansion readiness.
16- **Jordan Land Transporters Union and National Logistics Association**: Discussed Road bottlenecks, vehicle readiness, and potential 24/7 operation requirements.
17- **Jordan Chamber of Industry**: Shared insights on private-sector capacity to support corridor logistics and supply chain demands.
18- **Relevant Jordanian Businesspersons**: Explored PPP models and opportunities to invest in the Jericho Logistics Hub.
19- **Jordan and Egypt Embassies in Ramallah**: Discussed potentials of this initiative and suggested further coordination.
20- **UN Agencies**: Consulted on operational bottlenecks and priority needs for coordination.
21- **NGOs and Experts**: Contributed feedback on last-mile delivery gaps and organizational coordination frameworks.

In addition to many small separate meetings with some of the above, the consultations included several workshops and large meetings in Ramallah, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Amman.

Engagement Modalities and Meeting Highlights

- **Multi-stakeholder workshops** held in **Ramallah** and **Amman**, focused on:
  - Projected import volumes and infrastructure needs
  - Border crossing reform and corridor security
  - Hub design and humanitarian delivery scenarios
- **Technical roundtables** with logistics experts and corridor planners
- **Private-sector dialogues** focused on PPP financing and incentives

These consultations ensured that the study reflects real-world conditions, accounts for interagency coordination needs, and is positioned for successful uptake by policy and operational actors across the region.

Annex B: The Unprecedented Magnitude of Destruction and Destitution in Gaza – A Snapshot as of End-January 2025

The Gaza Strip has experienced unparalleled devastation due to the ongoing war, resulting in large-scale loss of life, mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and the collapse of essential services. By end-January 2025, approximately **90% of the housing stock**—about **160,000 housing units destroyed** and **276,000 damaged**—was rendered uninhabitable.
Over **80% of commercial facilities** and **70% of Gaza's road network** were also reported to be either destroyed or severely damaged. Critical infrastructure—including power generation, water networks, hospitals, and schools—has been left inoperative, and humanitarian access remains constrained by ongoing hostilities and security risks.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

- Over **1.9 million individuals** have been forcibly displaced.
- Around **500,000 IDPs** returned to destroyed zones in North Gaza and Gaza City.
- Over **543 overcrowded shelters** were hosting displaced persons in temporary structures (tents, open spaces, or schools).
- **Winterization needs** included **50,000 new tents**, **100,000 plastic sheets**, and emergency supplies such as **blankets and winter clothes**.
- Many shelters were **unprotected from flooding, wind, and cold** and were located in hazardous areas.

Infrastructure and Utilities

- Up to **90% of schools** suffered damage or destruction, affecting the education of over **600,000 children**.
- **Electricity blackouts** were near-total, impacting communications, water pumping, and health service delivery.
- **Water access** fell below **25% of pre-war capacity**, and **47% of people** received less than **15 liters/day**.
- **Wastewater treatment systems** have collapsed, exposing over **1 million people** to sanitation-related threats.

Food Security

- According to the **OCHA report of February 4, 2025**, **91% of Gaza's population**—approx. **1.95 million people**—were projected to face **IPC Level 3 or higher** food insecurity.
- Over **70% of livestock** were lost; **75% of croplands** and **70% of agricultural wells** destroyed.
- **72% of Gaza's fishing fleet** was rendered inoperable.
- **290,000 children under 5**, and **150,000 pregnant and lactating women** faced **critical malnutrition risks**.
- Over **60,000 children** required **immediate treatment for acute malnutrition**.

Health System Collapse

- Over **110,000 people were injured**, requiring trauma and long-term rehabilitative care.
- More than **1 million children** are in urgent need of **mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS)**.
- As of end-January 2025:
    - Only **10% of primary healthcare centers** were fully functional
    - Less than **50% of hospitals** were partially operational
    - Healthcare workers and ambulances were overwhelmed

This snapshot emphasizes the scale and urgency of the humanitarian catastrophe. Any reconstruction and recovery initiative must be underpinned by reliable logistics, uninterrupted aid corridors, and coordinated response systems capable of handling this unparalleled scope of need.

Annex C: Detailed Analysis of Required Imports into Gaza

Required quantities as expected once stability is achieved, full-scale aid delivery enabled, preliminary re-building starts and economic life resumes

Estimates for first 2 years (assumed to start on H2 2025)

Data and assumptions

	Unit	Number	Notes
Total population, excluding babies (0-2)	persons	2,000,000	
Babies	persons	300,000	
Residential buildings in need for re-building	Residential units	350,000	80% of housing stock, 100 m2 each
Schools, hospitals, clinics, other public buildings in need for rebuilding	m2	2,500,000	80% of all pre-war existing buildings + new and upgraded standards
Business sector buildings (industry, trade, hotels, offices, etc.)	m2	5,000,000	80% of all pre-war existing buildings + new and upgraded standards
Infrastructures facilities, excluding roads - WASH and other	m2	1,000,000	Water, electricity, etc.
Roads	km length	3,000	
Open paved public areas	m2	1,500,000	Mostly new, as will be planned in newly built residential neighborhoods
Number of prefabricated houses	Units	300,000	Temporary solution for use over 5 years , until building of new residential neighborhoods is completed
Non-bulk items - number of pallets per truck	number	24	
Non-bulk items - average weight per pallet	kg	750	
Bulk items - average weight per truck	Ton	25	

Calculation
Crossings work 360 days a year, 24 hours/day.
Preliminary calculations and estimates.

Categories of goods	Required quantity per day in tons	Trucks per day	Notes
Food products	2,849	**150**	Based on Israeli consumption averages per person
Cereals and cereal products	548	22	
Meat	329	18	
Fruits and vegetables:	877	49	
Milk and dairy, eggs	986	55	
Oils and fats	110	6	
Bottled water and beverages	898	**50**	Based on Israeli average, except bottled water
Bottled Water	460	26	Estimate
Soft Drinks	274	15	
Fruit Juices	164	9	
Baby products	45	**3**	
Baby formula	16	1	
baby diapers	29	2	
Non-food household consumption products	1,712	**95**	Finished products and raw material for production inside Gaza. 5 times Israeli annual quantities, as most families lost their belongings and need to buy it all
Clothing and garments	315	18	Including babies
Furniture	411	23	
Home Appliances	548	30	
Kitchenware	137	8	
Textiles (e.g., curtains, bed linens)	219	12	
Decorative Items	82	5	

Residential units	42,911	**1,825**	Import of required inputs for building the required houses will be split over four years
Cement (for concrete)	1,918	77	400 kg cement per 1 ton of concrete. 20 ton concrete per 100 m2.
Iron	479	19	
Bricks or their raw materials	33,562	1,342	10,000 bricks equivalent, 14 kg per brick
Plaster and paint	479	27	
Floor tiles	5,993	333	25 kg per a m2 of ceramic tiles
Electricity, sanitary wood and other internal items	479	27	finished products or their raw material
Non-residential public buildings	4,087	**174**	Import of required inputs for building the required buildings, roads. etc. will be split over three years
Cement (for concrete)	183	7	400 kg cement per 1 ton of concrete. 0.4-ton concrete per m2.
Iron	46	2	
Bricks or their raw materials	3,196	128	
Plaster and paint	46	3	
Floor tiles	571	32	
Electricity, sanitary wood and other internal items	46	3	
Business-sector buildings		**348**	
Cement (for concrete)	365	15	
Iron	91	4	
Bricks or their raw materials	6,393	256	
Plaster and paint	91	5	
Floor tiles	1,142	63	
Electricity, sanitary wood and other internal items	91	5	
Infrastructures facilities, excluding roads		**104**	50% more material per m2 as these structures require stronger construction. Construction split over 3 years
Cement (for concrete)	110	4	
Iron	27	1	
Bricks or their raw materials	1,918	77	

Plaster and paint	27	2	
Floor tiles	342	19	
Electricity, sanitary wood and other internal items	27	2	
Roads		**1,167**	Computation based on a general estimate for a standard two-lane road. Construction split over 3 years
Gravel	16,438	658	4,000 m3 per 1 km. m3 = 1.5 ton
Asphalt	3,288	132	
Sand	8,219	329	2,000 m3 per 1 km. m3 = 1.5 ton
Cement (for concrete)	822	33	
Steel (rebar)	137	5	
Bitumen	274	11	
Open paved public areas, sidewalks, etc.		**58**	
Gravel	822	32.9	
Asphalt	164	6.6	
Sand	411	16.4	
Cement (for concrete)	41	1.6	
Steel (rebar)	7	0.3	
Bitumen	14	0.5	
Temporary prefabricated houses and sheltering items		**431**	
Prefabricated houses	411	411	To be imported over the first 2 years.
Tents, blankets and other temporary shelter items		20	Estimate
Equipment and machines for industry, agriculture, building, infrastructure facilities, etc.		**100**	Estimate
Industrial, agricultural and other inputs		**400**	Estimate. Excluding raw cloth, wood, and other raw materials for garments, furniture, etc.

Medical supplies, etc.		**30**	Estimate
Cars, trucks, spare parts, etc.		**50**	Estimate
Fuels, oils, etc.		**400**	Estimate
Other, not included elsewhere		**200**	Estimate
Grand total	2,849	**5,584**	

Annex D: Amman Workshop (May 2025) – Comments of Participants and Study-Team Suggestions

The workshop held in Jordan, in early May 2025, was attended by representatives from the Amman Chamber of Industry (ACI), Aqaba Logistics Village (ALV), the World Food Program in Amman, and an organizer of the Palestine Logistics Cluster based in Amman. Notable Palestinian logistics and freight service providers also attended.

The following are comments summarized from attendees, and solutions suggested by the study team.

Political Stability as a Requirement: A stable political arrangement remains the most significant challenge.

Scale of Rebuilding Gaza: Assessments highlight the huge scale of reconstruction required in the current crossing capacity.

Engagement with Authorities: Discussions with all relevant stakeholders are critical to ensure smooth operations and reduce administrative delays.

The study team suggest*s establishing a committee from both the Palestinian and Jordanian private sectors to follow up issues with the Jordanian and Palestinian authorities. This committee will deal with any new developments.*

<u>Logistical Challenges at Jordanian Borders:</u>

Insufficient workforce and scanner staff.

The study team suggest*s arranging with customs Jordan to open on Friday to clear the left-behind cargo*

Limited working hours.

The study team comments that *working hours at the Jordanian side is depending on the working hours at the Israeli side of KHB which unfortunately leads to the return of a large number of trucks without being unloaded on the Israeli side, in addition, stopping work on Friday and Saturday, which results in congestion on the Jordanian side and confused the work on Thursday and Sunday.*

Requirement to unload all container goods at checkpoints.

The study team comments that t*his is because the Israeli authorities do not allow entry of containers.*

Restrictions preventing drivers from accessing truck waiting zones overnight or on off-days (impacting refrigerated goods).

The study team suggest*s discussion with Jordanian customs to allow drivers to stay with the cargo to monitor reefer trucks.*

Frequent regulatory changes.

<u>Logistical Challenges at West Bank Borders – controlled by Israel:</u>

Need for additional workers and customs staff.

The study team comments that *Jordanian authorities suggested to provide Jordanian workers*

Limited working hours.

The study team suggest*s coordinating with international parties to negotiate with Allenby Bridge management to increase working hours.*

Unreasonable increases in customs assessment values.

The study team comments that t*his issue is related to Israeli customs re-evaluation of cargo and we should approach the PA Customs to handle this issue*

Time-consuming back-to-back processes.

The study team proposes to set an official request to both the Israeli and the Jordanian authorities to allow the trucks to enter into both Jordan and the Palestinian authorities for Loading and offloading instead of the back to back at the Bridge.

Streamlining Crossings: Agreed that the master plan should include specific, actionable solutions (e.g., technology for pre-clearance, joint inspections as military to military).

<u>Infrastructure and Capacity Expansion:</u>

Agreement on the need to enhance:

Crossing capacity**.**

Internal logistics and distribution routes.

Infrastructure and security scanners.

Reopening Key Trade Routes:

Consensus on the importance of reopening the Damyia Bridge and increasing the capacity of Wadi Araba's southern crossing for goods.

The study team suggest*s raising the issue of re-opening Damyia/Prince Mohamed Bridge for Cargo services with the Jordanian Authorities to be negotiated with the Israeli and Palestinian Authorities*

Logistics Hub in Jordan:

Agreed on the need to establish a logistics area in Jordan with PPP involvement for sustainability.

The study team suggest*s to discuss the opportunity of the permission to enter a private sector at King Hussein Bridge to allow the private sector to invest in logistics facilities with the Jordan customs authorities*

<u>Regional Integration</u>:

While acknowledging that regional integration is a long-term objective, we need to identify immediate steps to foster on-the-ground cooperation.

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